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1. Introduction 
This book is a collection of reprints of published papers based on the doctoral 
dissertations of its two authors. Peter Desain’s thesis is entitled Structure and 
Expressive Timing in Music Performance and addresses two topics: the detection 
of metric beats in a performance and the ways in which a performance becomes 
“expressive” through departure from a perfectly rigid spacing of those beats. 
Honing’s thesis, Music and the Representation of Structure: From Issues to 
Microworlds, is about representation structures for music applications and their 
impact on programming various music tasks, particularly those related to 
composition. Since such matters of representation and programming must address 
both the definition of metric beats and their expressive interpretation, much of 
the work in both theses seems to be a product of mutual effort. 
In spite of its generality, the title of the book is more or less accurate. The 
underlying focus of all of these papers is on mental processes associated with 
“music behavior” and the modeling of those processes by a machine. The 
attempts to develop and analyze the resulting models with scientific discipline are 
admirable, although, as we shall see, sometimes methodologically flawed. 
However, these flaws serve to point out just how subtle and elusive the problems 
examined by Desain and Honing are. So even if the results are not always 
successful, the book is an important contribution to artificial intelligence as a 
study of several aspects of human behavior which have received comparatively 
little serious attention. It is also a valuable contribution to the computer music 
literature-an area in which the aesthetic appeal of the results may often carry 
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more weight than the issue of whether or not those results are based on an 
underlying theory. 
After an introductory precis. in which the authors survey the contents of the 
book, and an entertaining summary of their study of expressive performance, the 
book is divided into three sections. “Perception” consists of five papers dealing 
with the topics of the detection of metric beats (i.e. “finding the beat” in a 
recorded performance) and the relation of expressive performance to those metric 
beats. “Representation” presents three papers which address both general issues 
and the specific problems of representing timing and applying such a representa- 
tion to the synthesis of expressive performances. Finally, “Methodology” is 
basically an account of programming experiences, including a discussion of the 
virtues of the functional style of LISP. an analysis of a meter detection program 
by Christopher Longuet-Higgins. and descriptions of two of the authors’ own 
programs. 
Ultimately. however, this organization of material turns out to be slightly 
artificial. An alternative organization based on the topics of the two contributing 
theses would probably have been preferable, particularly for anyone who plans to 
read this book cover-to-cover to learn about the achievements of its authors. 
Unfortunately, it is unclear that a collection of reprints is the most effective way 
to get across the story behind the efforts of these two thesis projects. Since all 
these articles were published separately, there are, on the one hand, considerable 
overlaps and, on the other. clear situations in which the ideas of an earlier paper 
have been revised in a later one. One might have been better off to have had the 
two theses reprinted in a common volume. 
Another problem, however, is that examining the research issues addressed by 
these theses is no easy matter. Since ‘*music cognition” faces a serious problem in 
grounding its results in actual music behavior [ 101, I felt somewhat skeptical about 
simply accepting the experimental results presented in this book at face value. 
(Most problematic is the fact that there just aren’t enough experimental results to 
justify many of the authors’ claims.) Therefore, particularly in the case of 
Desain’s work, I attempted to collect my own data to either reproduce those 
results or collect other results which would support the same’ conclusions. Since 
this review is really not an appropriate forum in which to present these technical 
results, I shall prepare them for later publication [13] and only briefly summarize 
them here. After that summary Honing’s issues of programming will be discussed: 
the needs for underlying representations and support tools. The review will then 
conclude with a general evaluation of the book. 
2. Theoretical issues 
2.1. Perception 
2.1.1. Musical rhythm 
The quantization problem 
One of the more interesting tasks in computer music has always been the 
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development of a program “which will transcribe a live performance of a classical 
melody into the equivalent of standard musical notation” [6]. Some of the most 
substantial pioneering research on this problem was conducted by Longuet- 
Higgins in the early seventies. He began by dividing the problem into two 
sub-problems concerned with the perception of rhythm and tonality, respectively. 
The latter problem involves determining what the key signature should be and 
what accidentals should be assigned to the notes which require them. The former 
problem requires determining which shapes, corresponding to duration values, 
should be assigned to each note. 
While Longuet-Higgins restricted his attention to melody, he was able to 
demonstrate some impressive results. When he reported these results in 1976 [6], 
he discussed his algorithm using the old “shave and a haircut” melodic cliche 
(Fig. 1). However, at the end of the paper, he provided two examples from the 
English horn solo which opens the first scene of the third act of Richard Wagner’s 
Tristan und Isolde-the sort of exercise which many humans would find quite 
challenging. These results demonstrated that Longuet-Higgins’ program was no 
mere toy. 
Unfortunately, the system never really caught on in the music community. 
Interest in computers in 1976 was still quite low particularly since computers were 
beyond the budgets of most practicing musicians; and interest in artificial 
intelligence was even lower. To make matters worse, Longuet-Higgins had coded 
his program in POP2, whose popularity was even less that that of artificial 
intelligence. By the time musicians were more disposed to think seriously about 
computers and artificial intelligence, Longuet-Higgins’ work had been all but 
forgotten. 
Desain, however, not only remembered Longuet-Higgins but found him 
inspirational. He decided to focus his attention on the rhythmic side of Longuet- 
Higgins’ results-the problem of interpreting temporal intervals on a continuous 
scale as discrete symbols representing different values of musical duration. He 
began with a thorough study of Longuet-Higgins’ source code in an attempt to 
develop a theory to explain why it performed the way it did. At the same time, 
given that POP2 is no longer a particularly active language, he re-implemented 
the system in COMMON LISP. 
The result of this labor of love is documented in this book in the paper “Parsing 
the Parser: a case study in programming style”. This paper is delightful reading. 
On the one hand it is an admirable exposition of a methodology which would be 
well applied to other results in artificial intelligence. At the same time it is a very 
personal document, always willing to acknowledge the assistance received from 
Longuet-Higgins himself but never trying very hard to conceal the many 
frustrations encountered when dealing with code which was rather less than 
impeccably engineered. 
Fig. 1. Longuet-Higgins’ First Rhythmic Test 
Ultimately. Desain arrived at several uncomfortable conclusions. Most im- 
portant was that there was really less theory in the code than met the eye. Indeed, 
some portions of the code exhibited rather eccentric behavior which could not be 
interpreted as “musical knowledge.” Furthermore, the operation of the program 
itself was dependent on the proper setting of several parameters; so one could not 
view it as a simple system which accepted a performance as input and generated 
duration notation as output. Thus, as far as Desain was concerned, this 
“quantization problem” of inferring rhythms expressed in the symbols of music 
notation from the continuum of durational values of performances was far from 
solved. 
A connectionist solution 
Working together, Desain and Honing decided to see if connectionism would 
provide a more satisfactory handle on the quantization problem than Longuet- 
Higgins’ symbolic approach had. To this end they developed a feed-forward 
network which iteratively adjusted the durations assigned to sequences of events 
with the goal of “steering” the ratios between successive durations towards simple 
integer ratios. The principles behind the design of this network are discussed in 
“The Quantization of Musical Time: A Connectionist Approach”. The resulting 
system is then compared with that of Longuet-Higgins in the following paper, “A 
Connectionist and a Traditional AI Quantizer, Symbolic versus Sub-symbolic 
Models of Rhythm Perception”. 
Unfortunately, this comparison leaves much to be desired. Most important is 
that both systems perform equally well on the one experimental test presented. 
Consequently. much of the discussion has more to do with what makes the 
connectionist approach theoretically preferable. What is lacking is a convincing 
argument that such theoretical superiority would actually yield better results in 
practice. Collecting additional data quickly revealed that it is not difficult to find 
situations in which neither system functions particularly well. Even Longuet- 
Higgins’ own Tristun example was not interpreted quite as well by his algorithm 
as he had claimed; but in spite of its shortcomings, his symbolic approach was a 
far more successful attempt than that of the Desain-Honing network. Ultimately, 
the problem is that both systems exhibit a common flaw: They attempt to perform 
all reasoning with respect to relationship between consecutive notes, totally 
overlooking the fact that those notes have been structured into measures. As a 
result neither system performs particularly satisfactorily; and they even tend to 
fail in similar ways 1131. This leaves the quantization problem as a challenging 
problem still in search of a practical solution. 
2.1.2. Expressive performance 
The other issue of perception which is investigated concerns those aspects of a 
musical performance which cause it to be perceived as “expressive”. This work 
was actually performed by Desain with another colleague, Siebe de Vos, and is 
documented in the paper, “Autocorrelation and the Study of Musical Expres- 
sion”. As the title indicates. the paper is concerned with applying autocorrelation 
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to timing data of actual performances. The motivation for this approach is that 
“musical expression” is based on a variation of regularities implicit in the 
structure of the music being performed. Thus, analysis of the music must precede 
its expressive performance, which then serves to highlight the regularities 
detected by analytical reasoning. 
This immediately poses a paradox in Desain’s approach. Autocorrelation is 
basically a technique concerned with detecting regularities in time series. 
However, such regularities have more to do with the analysis of a musical 
composition prior to performance than they have to do with the performance 
itself. Expression is often implemented by departures from regularity which call 
the attention of the listener to key moments in the musical structure. Thus, 
Desain may have taken off on the wrong foot in attempting to make a case for 
autocorrelation as a tool. 
He has further compounded the problem by choosing a musical example which 
may not be particularly appropriate: the C major prelude from the first volume of 
Johann Sebastian Bach’s Well Tempered Clavier. The reason this choice of music 
is awkward is that it is composed as a perfectly uniform sequence of events: from 
the very beginning until the final sustained chord, every duration interval has 
exactly the same notation+ne sixteenth note. Thus, from a point of view of 
analysis, autocorrelation has no information to provide. If applied to metronome- 
perfect performance, it will yield flat values of 1.0 at any point in the score over 
any lag interval. 
Suppose the performance is not metronome-perfect (i.e. “expressive”); what, 
then, can the autocorrelation function say? Unfortunately, the answer to this 
question depends on how the performer chooses to be expressive. There is a long 
tradition of performance of this particular composition in which the pianist aims 
for a perfect evenness of rhythm and conveys all expression through the loudness 
of the individual notes.’ I applied Desain’s techniques to just such a performance 
by a professional piano teacher. While I did not get the uniformity obtained from 
the metronone-perfect performance, the analysis yielded little by way of detecting 
significant events. Indeed, the only such event, which was also clearly audible, 
was a missed note. 
The conclusion, then, is that this paper is based on insufficient data which may 
not be particularly representative. Furthermore, it may be resting on faulty 
assumptions about the role of regularity of data. There is a confusion of analysis 
and performance in Desain’s approach which may ultimately defeat the value of 
statistical techniques such as autocorrelation. Finally, and, perhaps, most im- 
portantly, there is a question of whether timing data can be studied in isolation. 
At the very least, loudness contributes as much to expressive performance as does 
timing; and often the interaction between these two factors is more important 
’ It is perhaps fair to observe that such a technique cannot be achieved with a harpsichord, which is 
often the “instrument of choice” in the performance of Bach. However, this is not the issue. Piano 
performance need not be (and rarely is) an attempt to reproduce a performance as it would have 
sounded on a harpsichord. 
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than either considered in isolation. Desain should be praised for calling attention 
to expressive performance as an area of human behavior which deserves study, 
but future investigators should probably take a long and hard look at his 
assumptions before trying to extend the techniques he has proposed. 
2.2. Programming 
2.2.1. Representation issues 
The key issues of representation are discussed in a paper by Honing entitled, 
appropriately enough, “Issues in the Representation of Time and Structure in 
Music”. In moving from questions of perception to those of representation, the 
book gets less scientific and more philosophical. Most important is the problem 
that there is less by way of experimental evidence to back up any of Honing’s 
conclusions. Indeed, it is unclear that those conclusions could be substantiated by 
such evidence. 
Nevertheless, music raises questions of representation which tend to be 
overlooked when one is concerned with other areas of application. Even the 
matter of just what is being structured through the imposition of a representation 
is an open question, and it is important that Honing bothers to raise it. 
Unfortunately, he never really confronts the question directly, dwelling only on 
the distinction between score and sound. This distinction is definitely important, 
particularly to those naive enough to believe that all valid study of music can be 
reduced to the study of those notation constructs which go into performing scores. 
Honing is not alone in his appreciation of the errors of such naivete. The 
significance of this issue has also be raised by Jeanne Bamberger [2]. However, 
Honing’s approach overlooks one of Bamberger’s most important points-that 
music is fundamentally behavior resulting in sound. If a score is involved in the 
process at all, it is merely as a specification for that behavior. Any description 
which fails to acknowledge the significant role of such behavior also fails to 
acknowledge the music. 
While Honing’s arguments tend to be weak for lack of consideration of what 
actually goes into the practice of music, he still manages to leave the reader with 
food for thought in the form of five concrete conclusions: 
(1) A representation should be as formal as possible. Even when the 
meaning is removed from the formal system it must be possible to prove 
its correctness (i.e. not dependent on knowledge outside the the [sic] 
formal definition). 
(2) A representation should be as declarative as possible. Declarative 
representations were shown to have preference over procedural repre- 
sentations, even though some information is more naturally represented 
in a procedural way. 
(3) A representation should be as explicit as possible. All relations and 
knowledge should be explicitly stated in the representation. 
(4) All the controversies [concerning representation] need combined solu- 
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tions in which [opposing perspectives] can be expressed. The idea of 
having multiple representations of the same “world” seems useful. 
(5) Musical structure should be associated with time intervals. Constraints 
on these time intervals model the specific musical constructs and their 
behavior. These constraints should be part of the representation, i.e. 
part of the syntax, so that the operations on the representation get the 
behavior resulting from these restrictions for free. [p. 1421. 
These are the words of a sane and sober computer scientist, and they are likely be 
be comforting to other computer scientists who have tried to experiment with 
music. Those who deal with music at a more intuitive level, however, may have 
grounds for skepticism. 
The key problem with Honing’s discussion is that it overlooks the fact that one 
may have both prescriptive and descriptive representations for music. Prescriptive 
representations are necessary if one is to control devices, such as sound-syn- 
thesizing hardware. Such representations are basically variations on programming 
languages [ll]; so they definitely need to be based upon formal foundations, if 
they are not, themselves, formal. Whether they are declarative or procedural is 
probably not a major issue, unless one is interested in proving that the 
representation has certain properties, regardless of what one hears when the 
program is actually “run”. Obviously, however, Honing’s requirement of explicit- 
ness is of paramount importance; if the representation is not explicit, it may not 
admit of a consistent interpretation, in which case it may not always “run” the 
same way. (This may actually be desirable to some composers; but I suspect that, 
more often than not, explicit behavior is likely to be preferable.) Multiple 
representations, on the other hand, are probably superfluous as far as prescription 
is concerned: The basic objective is to achieve some desired effect, and what is 
important is that there be some one way in which that goal may be satisfied. 
Finally, the grounding of the representation in time intervals is also important, 
although whether that interpretation is grounded in a relative or absolute 
representation of time is probably an open question. (Achieving different effects 
may require different approaches to grounding the representation.) 
When we move from prescriptive representations to descriptive ones, the above 
arguments begin to weaken. Describing music experiences is very much an open 
question, even if we have been doing it, in one way or another, for several 
hundred years [4]. Between music criticism and music theory, we must accept the 
fact that description remains very tightly coupled to our ability to use natural 
language, generally supplemented by either performing examples of music 
behavior or displaying examples of prescriptive representations (which are usually 
musical scores). Furthermore, it is unclear that the desiderata summarized by 
Honing in his conclusions are really that desirable. 
In particular the description of music experiences is a highly subjective process, 
whose subjectivity tends to be resolved through the negotiations of dialog among 
the parties discussing the music, rather than through formal analysis. As a result 
there is little to be gained from formal representations for description, and such 
representations may actually inhibit the inherent subjectivity of the process. 
Similarly the representation need not necessarily be declarative. Description of a 
behavior may require some other form of behavior in order to be effective. Even 
explicitness may not be particularly desirable. If all one can achieve through 
supplemented verbal description is some experience of vague impressions, those 
impressions should not be sacrificed simply because they cannot be translated into 
a more explicit form. Multiple representations are probably desirable, although in 
the absence of a formal, declarative, and explicit representation, it may be that all 
one requires of a less formal representation is that it be highly flexible in which 
case multiple representations may not be a particularly important issue. Even the 
grounding of the representation of time intervals may be called into question, 
since the perception of time is. itself, highly subjective. 
Does this mean that representation is out of the question? No, because there 
are alternatives to Honing’s approach. The most viable to date seems to be that of 
David Lewin [5]. Lewin began with the subjectivity of time-consciousness, as first 
discussed by Edmund Husserl [S]. He tried to accommodate that subjectivity in 
his own descriptive representation of music experiences. The representation he 
developed is not any sort of “ultimate solution” [12]; but it probably takes more 
steps in the right direction than Honing has taken. 
2.2.2. Programming support 
Fortunately, Honing has more to offer than philosophy. The final two papers in 
the book discuss two implemented systems, “LOCO: A Composition Microworld 
in Logo” (developed with Desain) and “POCO: An Environment for Analysing, 
Modifying, and Generating Expression in Music.” Given that this latter paper is 
the final “statement” of the book. one would have hoped that it would provide 
some sort of a synthesis in an attempt to apply earlier philosophical speculations 
to the sorts of concrete issues of expressive performance reviewed above in 
Section 2.1.2. Unfortunately, this is not the case; and, indeed, the paper is so 
weak that the reader does not even come away with much intuition about what 
POCO looks like or how it might actually be used. 
The LOCO story. on the other hand, is more interesting, but more because, as 
a concrete system. it runs straight into some of the philosophical pitfalls 
considered in Section 2.2.1. For example in order to implement explicitness, 
LOCO assumes that every instruction is interpreted with respect to its own 
particular supporting architecture. This is basically a reductio ad absurdurn of the 
Vienna Definition Language [ 141, where different constructs are interpreted 
according to different architectures. This makes the semantics of the entire 
language extremely opaque. and language constructs may not even admit of 
consistent interpretations. 
It is also interesting to note that there is nothing in the definition of the 
primitives of LOCO which makes a commitment to what “musical objects” are, 
even though the purpose of the language appears to be to enable the manipula- 
tion of such objects in a Logo-like setting. The nature of musical objects seems to 
be passed on to the definition of the architectures which support the interpreta- 
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tion of the LOCO primitives. This is good in that the language is not predisposed 
to, for example, nineteenth-century conventions about what music is (or is not); 
but it is not so good in that it basically evades, at the language level, any 
committment to drop its semantic anchor, so to speak. 
There also seems to be a potential for confusion in how LOCO has decided to 
deal with time. Specifying timing relations is a critical element of the LOCO 
language; but the handling of these relations seems to fly in the face of the 
conclusions of Honing’s representation paper (Section 2.2.1). Timing relations 
have to to with events (as have been investigated by James Allen [l] and Drew 
McDermott [7]). Even if it is unclear just what “musical objects” are, it should 
not be taken for granted that they, themselves, are events, which seems to be 
what LOCO has done. The result is a rather loose assignment of symbolic labels 
to some relatively weak intuitions which may lead to confusion as soon as we 
encounter any “real” music, such as when we try to consider the compatibility of 
the example program jam with any experience of actual jazz. 
These final chapters thus offer up two programming languages which may be 
solutions in search of just the right problems. It remains to be seen if either will 
find some niche in which its capabilities will be appropriate. Unfortunately, the 
prospects of that niche having anything to do with the current practice of music do 
not appear to be particularly sanguine. 
3. The value of the book 
3.1. Resource of material 
It is always easy to argue with authors after a book has been written. Incentive 
for such argument need not be viewed as a liability. It can be an asset if the book 
provides sufficient resources that the “loyal opposition” can use it in preparing 
alternative points of view. This book is definitely a valuable resource, particularly 
in matters of musical perception. In addition to the accounts of interesting 
experiments, the papers offer many useful pointers to the general literature. Any 
researcher who wishes to “enter the game” will be well off making this the first 
book he reads. As long as he brings a healthy inquiring mind to that reading he 
will be well-positioned to venture into the rest of the literature as prelude to 
preparing for his own investigations. 
3.2. Quality of presentation 
The value of any information available in a book, however, is often modulated 
by how easy it is for the reader to acquire that information. Fortunately, Desain 
and Honing tend to write with an affable style; and they have the good sense to 
keep the affability from getting in the way of the more concrete offerings. Less 
fortunate is a tendency towards cuteness is some of the titles which does not 
always reflect the true contents of the paper. (After one has read it, one can 
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appreciate why one paper has the title “Time Functions Function Best as 
Functions of Multiple Times”; but initial exposure to that particular title tends to 
beget confusion.) More important is that, for the most part, the texts themselves 
tend to be more straightforward than such cloying titles. For the most part, 
finding information in this book can be reduced to a matter of judicious 
skimming, guided by the organization of the entire volume. 
3.3. Axes to grind 
There is also the matter of how a sense of competition can further research 
progress. Minsky wrote about this in The Society of Mind [9] in his discussion of 
the “Professor Challenger” phenomenon. (If you do not have an actual oppo- 
nent, inventing one may provide incentive to work harder.) For Desain and 
Honing the “Professor Challenger” is Johan Sundberg, who has, for several 
years, run a research program concerned with expressive performance at the 
Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm [3]. It is unclear whether or not 
Sundberg deserves to be regarded as a serious competitor as far as allocation of 
funds are concerned. However, his methodology differs markedly from that of 
Desain and Honing. While Desain and Honing look for better ways to collect and 
analyze data from actual performances, Sundberg’s group has taken an “analysis 
by synthesis” approach, developing rule bases for interpreting raw score data in 
such a way as to synthesize expressive performances. 
One would expect Desain and Honing to discuss extensively the work of the 
Sundberg group in their own reports. However, one sometimes gets the feeling 
that they are straining to demonstrate how their own work is unique. Such a strain 
should not be necessary, since the two projects are based on such markedly 
different foundations. One wonders if Desain and Honing are protesting a bit too 
much in trying to criticize the Sundberg group when the results of that group 
could actually serve as a valuable source of additional data. Sundberg and his 
colleagues have chosen to represent their results in the form of production rules. 
A natural question would be to ask how many of those rules are consistent with 
the results reported be Desain and Honing, which rules are not consistent, and 
how such inconsistencies may be explained. Also, if the Sundberg group is now 
synthesizing actual performances, it would make sense to feed such performances 
to the analysis techniques reported in this book and see if those results are 
consistent with the expectations behind such synthesized performances. 
3.4. Incentive for future research 
Most important, however, is that the work reported in this book is far from 
complete; and these papers provide future researchers with data, programs, and 
methodologies for continuing down this very interesting path of inquiry. As has 
already been observed, we are ultimately dealing with some fundamental issues of 
behavior; and the context of music may be very useful for exploring more general 
questions about how mind actually controls behavior and how such control may 
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be implemented. This book is less valuable as a source of answers than as a 
presentation of material which encourages many further questions. The interested 
reader will be able to put down this book after reading it well prepared for 
investigating those questions and, perhaps, even posing some new ones. 
What about the reader who is not that interested in the specific topics under 
investigation? This book is still of value to the general artificial intelligence 
community for the perspective it offers on connections between music and AI. In 
the early days of AI, it was assumed that “musical intelligence” would be 
demonstrated by a program capable of composing music as well as a human 
could. Such a musical analogy to the Turing test attracts less attention now that 
there have been musical compositions which were products of algorithms; and the 
idea of “understanding” music now seems to embrace listening and performing, 
as well as composing. The first reprint in this book is written in such a way that 
even a reader with a relatively general understanding of music can appreciate how 
artificial intelligence may approach problems of listening and performing, so the 
artificial intelligence literature has benefitted from the expanded view of AI 
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